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Abstract 
The Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY, literally "National Health Insurance Programme"), is a 
health insurance scheme run by the Indian government for India’s poorest households. The 
beneficiaries from RSBY belong to different caste and religious groups. In this context, the paper asks 
two questions. The first is a general question that applies all RSBY card holders – does the possession 
of a RSBY card benefit the holder in a non-health sphere? The second question is do persons 
belonging to the dominant groups in Indian society succeed in capturing a disproportionate number of 
these cards? We attempt to answer these two questions by using a unique survey of 1,500 RSBY card 
holding households conducted by the authors in two Indian states, Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra. We 
conclude that the RSBY poses two barriers: the barriers associated with getting a card and the barriers 
associated with using a card even though one might be in possession of one. In Maharashtra, those 
higher up the income ladder, and those in higher social groups, were significantly more likely to have 
a card than those on the lowest rung economically and socially. The same is true of usage. Having got 
a card, it was the better off sections of card holders who were more likely to use them. 
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1. Introduction  
 The Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY, literally "National Health Insurance 
Programme"), is a health insurance scheme run by the Indian government for India’s poorest 
households and has won plaudits from the World Bank, the UN and the ILO as one of the world's best 
health insurance schemes.  Under RSBY, every "below poverty line" (BPL) family, holding a yellow 
ration card1, pays 30 (less than US$0.7) registration fee for a biometric-enabled smart card 
containing their fingerprints and photographs. This enables them to receive inpatient medical care of 
up to 30,000 (approximately US$670) per family, per year, in any of the empanelled hospitals. Pre-
existing illnesses are covered from day one, for the household head, spouse and up to three dependent 
children or parents. The scheme, which started enrolling on April 1, 2008, has been implemented in 
25 states of India with, to date, a total enrolment of 33 million families from whom 4.3 million 
persons have received treatment under the scheme.   
About three-fourths of funding for RSBY is provided by the central government and the 
remainder by the appropriate state government.  The scheme is aimed at BPL workers in the 
unorganised sector and their families. It also covers all beedi2 workers registered under the Beedi 
Workers Welfare Fund and issued identity cards by the Welfare Commissioner Ministry of Labour & 
employment/State Government, all domestic workers age 18 years and above, and all street vendors 
with a license from Municipal Corporation or Local Bodies.  
 A crucial requirement for a household to get a RBSY card is that it should be a BPL 
household.  On the basis of a “BPL census” conducted by the Government of India, each household is 
assigned a poverty score based on its profile. 3 Based on these scores, a government-determined cut 
off point (termed the BPL cut off line) is used to separate BPL from APL (above poverty line) 
households. The last BPL survey was done in 2002 and scores based on this were used for RSBY 
registration. All the households listed in the BPL category were informal sector workers since any 
household that had at least one regular salaried, or formal sector, worker was considered to be an APL 
household. 
   The beneficiaries from RSBY belong to different caste and religious groups. In terms of 
caste, the broad division is between upper-caste Hindus, Hindus from the Other Backward Classes 
(OBC), and the Scheduled Castes (SC), the latter comprising the formerly ‘untouchable’ castes.  In 
terms of religion, the broad distinction is between Hindus and Muslims.  In this context, the paper 
asks two questions. The first is a general question that applies all RSBY card holders – does the 
possession of a RSBY card benefit the holder in a non-health sphere by, say, improving his/her 
capacity to function better by virtue of the fact that anxiety with respect to health problems has been 
alleviated?4 The second question is a group-specific one. Given that the possession of a RSBY card 
confers health-related benefits5  – and may even confer non-health elated benefits – do persons 
belonging to the dominant groups in Indian society succeed in capturing a disproportionate number of 
these cards? 
 We attempt to answer these two questions by using a unique survey of RSBY card holders 
conducted by the authors. This survey of 1,500 BPL households in two Indian states, Uttar Pradesh 
                                                     
1 BPL families are entitled to a yellow ration card in contrast to “above poverty line” (APL) families who are 
only entitled to a white card. The yellow card holders are entitled to a higher ration than the white card holders. 
2 An indigenous “cigarette” made as tobacco wrapped in a leaf. 
3 See Appendix for details of BPL calculations. 
4 For example, there might be a greater willingness to make productive investments based on a greater sense of 
health security. 
5 Compared to a BPL family not holding a RSBY card, a BPL family holding a RBSY card is better off if there 
happens to be an illness of (comparable gravity) in both families, if only because it is required to spend less on 
that episode of ill-health 
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(UP) and Maharashtra, with 750 respondents from each state, is described in some detail in section 3. 
Before that, section 2 informs the reader about how RSBY works      
 
2. How RSBY Works  
  The implementation of RSBY is based on the public- private partnership model.   After a 
competitive bidding process a public or private insurance company is given a license to provide health 
insurance subject to certain conditions. At the time of bidding, the insurance companies have to 
provide a list of empanelled hospitals which are prepared to be part of the RSBY scheme for cashless 
treatment facilities. Both public and private hospitals can be included in the list of empanelled 
hospitals which must meet certain basic minimum requirements. Under the scheme, hospitals which 
specialise in the treatment of various diseases are empanelled so that the beneficiaries can get access 
to the health care appropriate to their illness.  
  The insurer must also agree to engage intermediaries with local presence (such as NGOs) in 
order to provide grassroots outreach and to assist members in utilising RSBY services after enrolment. 
The role of these local intermediaries is very important in the success of the RSBY scheme. They 
have to inform local BPL households about the dates and venues for registration under RSBY and the 
usefulness of the scheme. The selected insurance companies hires Third Party Administrators (TPA) 
for enrolling beneficiaries and each state government provides an electronic list of BPL households to 
the insurance companies.  
  The TPA plays an important role in the enrolment process. A list of households eligible for 
RSBY benefits is posted on the village panchayat notice board and other important public places a 
few days before the enrolment date. The TPA also informs villagers about the date and place of 
enrolment. 6 After enrolment, a biometric smart card, carrying a photograph of the head of the 
household, with biometric information (such as finger prints) of all five members of a beneficiary’s 
household, is printed and given to the beneficiary against a payment of 30. This smart card then 
allows cashless transactions for inpatient treatment expenses at empanelled hospitals, a list of these 
hospitals being also provided to the card holder.  Only those persons whose biometric information is 
stored on the smart card can avail of health care under RSBY. 
  Each empanelled hospital has a RSBY help desk with a card reader machine which is used to 
swipe the card so that all health costs related to the card holder’s treatment are debited to it. The 
empanelled hospitals send details of the expenses to the insurance agencies and money is transferred 
to the account of the empanelled hospitals. It is also mandatory that the persons obtaining treatment 
through RSBY are given details of the expenses deducted from their smart cards. The entire 
transaction is cashless and the patients seeking health care through RSBY need not to pay any cost for 
their treatment.   
All the transactions under the RSBY are monitored by the central ministry. After enrolment, 
information about all registered beneficiaries is sent to the Ministry of Labour and Employment and 
the RSBY desks of all empanelled hospitals in the country are linked to the central server of the 
Ministry. To help address grievances under the scheme, ‘redressal committees’ have been formed at 
the central, state and district level to manage the complaints of beneficiaries and stakeholders.  
 
3. The Survey 
 The Survey which provided the data for the study was located in two states: Uttar Pradesh 
(UP) and Maharashtra. The choice of states was based on three criteria: (i) completion of maximum 
number of years of RSBY; (ii) compared to the all-India average, a greater concentration of SC 
                                                     
6 Rajasekhar et.al.( 2011) ‘ Implementing Health Insurance: The rollout of Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana in 
Karnataka’, Economic and Political Weekly, May,2011, Vol. XLVI, No 20 p-57 
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persons and Muslim in the population; (iii) compared to the all-India average, a larger enrolment of 
households in the RSBY scheme. Table 1 compares the ‘RSBY performance’ of UP and Maharashtra 
with that of India in its entirety.   
  Table 1: Percentage distribution of population by socio-religious groups in study state 
S.N State/Sector SC ST Others Muslim 
1 India (Total) 16.2 8.2 75.6 13.4 
2 India (Rural) 17.9 10.4 71.7 12.0 
5 Uttar Pradesh (Total) 21.1 0.1 78.8 18.5 
6 Uttar Pradesh (Rural) 23.4 0.1 76.5 14.9 
7 Maharashtra (Total) 10.2 8.9 80.9 10.6 
8 Maharashtra (Rural) 10.9 13.4 75.7 5.5 
                           Source: Census of India, 2001, Registrar General of India   
Similar considerations prevailed with the choice of districts to be sampled within each state: 
Moradabad district in UP and Aurangabad district in Maharashtra. Moradabad was selected for this 
study because it had a higher proportion of Muslims than its parent state while, in Aurangabad, the 
proportions of both SC persons and Muslims were higher than the State averages (Table 2).  The 
details of the population in the two districts are shown in Table 3 while the geographical locations of 
the two districts, in the context of their parent states, are shown in the two maps below.   
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Table 2: State and district selected on the basis of selection criteria 
Study Area No. of 
districts 
with RSBY  
Number 
of Years 
Proportion of 
population to the state 
average 
No. of BPL 
families 
covered 
Hospitals 
Empanelled  
   SC ST Muslim  Govt. Private 
State: Uttar-
Pradesh 
All 70 
districts  
3 21  19 4024719 1113 679 
District: 
Moradabad 
 2 17  49 41643 
 
48 8 
State: 
Maharashtra 
All 35 
Districts  
3 10 9 11 2172918 1007 8 
District: 
Aurangabad 
 2 13 4 20 81835 
 
38 0 
Source: Census of India, 2001, Registrar General of India 
 
 
 
Table 3: Social composition of the populations of Moradabad and Aurangabad Districts  
Social Composition  Moradabad Aurangabad 
Households  573,100 549,900 
Population 3,811,000 2,897,000 
SC population  604,300 (15.9) 376,200 (13.0) 
Muslim population 1,735,400 (49.5) 1,004,00 (3.5) 
Non-SC/non-Muslim population 2,075,600  (54.5) 5,695,00 (19.7) 
                      Source: Census of India, 2001, Registrar General of India   
                          Note:  Figures in bracket is percentage distribution 
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Sample Selection and Sampling Methodology 
 Since the focus of this study is Muslims and persons from the SC (that is, ‘socially excluded’ or 
‘marginalised’ groups), we were careful to choose from our respondents an adequate number of such 
persons from both the ‘treated’ and ‘control’ groups. The ‘treated’ group comprised those that had RSBY 
cards where some of these card holders were from marginalised groups and the others from non-
marginalised groups.  The ‘control’ group comprised those that did not have RSBY cards where, again, 
some of these were from marginalised groups and the others from non-marginalised groups.  
 A total of 1,500 sample households were surveyed, with 750 households from each of the 
states of UP and Maharashtra.  Out of this total, 30% were non-beneficiary (or ‘control group’) 
households and the remaining households were beneficiary (or ‘treated group’) households. From the 
450 non-beneficiary households, two-thirds (300 households) were from ‘marginalised’ groups and 
the remainder from non-marginalised households. From the 1,050 beneficiary households, two-thirds 
(600 households) were from ‘marginalised’ groups and the remainder (450 households) were from 
‘non-marginalised’ households.  The distribution of the entire sample is shown in Table 4 below and 
the sampling methodology is detailed in Table 5.  
    Table 4: The Distribution of Households in the Survey  
 Moradabad, Uttar 
Pradesh 
Aurangabad, 
Maharashtra 
Total 
Control group I (Non-beneficiaries from non-marginalised 
group) @10%  75 75 150 
Control group II (Non-beneficiaries from marginalised group) 
@20%  150 150 300 
Treatment group I (Beneficiaries from non-marginalised group) 
@30% 225 225 450 
Treatment group II (Beneficiaries from marginalized group) 
@40% 300 300 600 
Total Households 750 750 1500 
 
Table 5: The sampling Procedure 
Methodology Details Respondents 
Household Survey  A detailed household schedule was canvassed among the sample 
households. The head or adult member of the household was the key 
respondent. However, for sections relating to maternity eligible women 
would be the respondents. 
 
Selected 1500 BPL 
household (750 from each 
district) 
Focus Group Discussion FGDs were conducted to find out the collective information from 
beneficiary of RSBY. 
Members of 
homogeneous socially 
excluded  group 
Key Informant interviews 
 
Interview with local and central government helped to contextualize issue 
that affect the lives of socially excluded beneficiary households , 
challenges and opportunities for supporting social inclusion and objective 
and goals of social interventions such as RSBY.   
Head of RSBY 
Beneficiary household, 
local and central 
government officials 
working in social 
interventions programs 
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4.  The Data 
 As detailed earlier, the data for the analysis were obtained from a survey of 1,500 BPL 
individuals in two Indian states, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh with 750 respondents from each state. 
The respondents were divided into three groups 
1. Those that did not have a RSBY card (hereafter, group 1).There were 450 households in this 
group comprising 30% of the sample of 1,500 households. 
2.  Those that had a RSBY card but had not used it (hereafter, group 2). There were 789 
households in this group comprising 53% of the sample of 1,500 households.  
3. Those that had a RSBY card and had used it (hereafter, group 3). There were 261 households 
in this group comprising 17% of the sample of 1,500 households.   
 The survey also provided information on the attributes of the respondents and Table 6 shows 
the average values of some of these characteristics classified according to card status. The main 
features of the table, in terms of differences between the households of different card status, is that 
group 3 households  had older household heads, a higher income, higher consumption expenditure 
(both in total and per capita), higher saving, and larger per capita land holding compared to group 1 or 
group 2 households.  
 Testing for differences in these variables between the groups, a pairwise comparison 
suggested that the differences between group 3 and 1, and between groups 3 and 2, in respect of age 
of household head, household income, and monthly household per capita consumption 
expenditure were significantly differently from zero7 but differences in monthly household 
consumption expenditure, household saving, and size of per person land holding were not 
significantly different from zero.  
Table 6: Individual Attributes by RSBY Card Status 
 Household does not have 
RSBY card 
Household has RSBY card but 
has not used it  
Household has RSBY card and 
has used it 
Age of Household Head 45.8 46.2 47.9 
Household size 5.5 5.4 5.3 
Number of children in 
household 
1.8 1.9 1.8 
Number of Males in 
household 
2.9 2.9 2.8 
Number of females in 
household 
2.6 2.5 2.5 
Average household 
monthly income 
5,547 5,569 6,024 
Average household 
monthly consumption 
expenditure 
2,708 2,718 2,891 
Average household 
monthly saving 
2,839 2,851 3,133 
Average household 
monthly per capita 
consumption expenditure 
516 522 567 
Household land per 
person 
0.39 0.34 0.43 
  
 Using the survey data, we defined three mutually exclusive social groups: (i) Scheduled caste 
(SC) households (447/1,500 households); (ii) non-SC Hindu households (593/1,500 households), 
hereafter Hindus; and (iii) non-Hindu and non-SC households (460/1,500 households), hereafter non-
Hindus.  Table 7 shows that of the 447 SC households, 33% did not have a card (group 1), 48% had a 
card but had not used it (group 2); and 19% had a card and had used it (group 3).  The proportions for 
non-Hindu households were comparable. However, compared to SC and non-Hindu households, 
                                                     
7 All significance levels quoted in this paper are at the 5% level. 
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Hindu households had a lower presence in group 1 (25%), a higher presence in group 2 (59%), and a 
lower presence in group 3 (16%). In summary, compared to SC and non-Hindu households, Hindu 
households were more inclined to take out a RSBY card but less inclined to use it.  
Table 7: RSBY Card status by social group 
 Household does not have 
RSBY card 
Household has RSBY 
card but has not used it 
Household has RSBY 
card and has used it 
Total 
Scheduled Castes 149 
(33%) 
[33%] 
215 
(48%) 
[27%] 
83 
(19%) 
[32%] 
447 
(100%) 
Non-SC Hindus 150 
(25%) 
[33%] 
348 
(59%) 
[44%] 
95 
(16%) 
[36%] 
593 
(100%) 
Non-Hindus 151 
(33%) 
[33%] 
226 
(49%) 
[29%] 
83 
(18%) 
[32%] 
460 
(100%) 
Total 450 789 261 1,500 
Figures in () represent row proportions and figures in [] represent column proportions  
 As Table 8, below, shows, there was no difference in the proportionate presence of illiterate 
and literate households in group 1: approximately 30% from each group did not have a card. Literacy 
did, however, have an effect on usage: 20% of literates, compared to 16% of illiterates, were in group 
3. 
Table 8: RSBY Card status by Illiteracy/literacy 
 Household does not have 
RSBY card 
Household has RSBY 
card but has not used it 
Household has RSBY 
card and has used it 
Total 
Illiterate 256 
(29%) 
477 
(55%) 
138 
(16%) 
871 
(100%) 
Literate 194 
(31%) 
312 
(50%) 
123 
(20%) 
629 
(100%) 
Total 450 789 261 1,500 
 
 Tables 9, 10, and 11 show the proportions in the different status categories by housing and 
related conditions. Table 9 shows that while the proportions not having a RSBY card were roughly 
similar between households living in pucca (made of brick or cement) and kutcha (made of mud or 
wood) houses, households living in pucca houses were more likely to use their cards (19%) compared 
to households in kutcha houses (12%). Similarly, Table 10 shows that while the proportions not 
having a RSBY card were roughly similar between households whose source of water was a tap or a 
tube well/hand pump, households whose source of water was the tap were more likely to use their 
cards (20%) compared to households whose source of water was the tube well/hand pump (15%).  
Lastly, Table 11 shows that households whose source of power was electricity were more likely to use 
their RSBY cards compared to households whose source of power was not electricity. 
Table 9: RSBY Card Status by Housing Conditions 
 Household does not have 
RSBY card 
Household has RSBY 
card but has not used it 
Household has RSBY 
card and has used it 
Total 
Pucca 349 
(30%) 
600 
(51%) 
220 
(19%) 
1,169 
(100%) 
Kutcha 101 
(31%) 
189 
(57%) 
41 
(12%) 
331 
(100%) 
Total 450 789 261 1,500 
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Table 10: RSBY Card Status by Households’ Source of Water 
 Household does not have 
RSBY card 
Household has RSBY 
card but has not used it 
Household has RSBY 
card and has used it 
Total 
Tap 187 
(30%) 
319 
(50%) 
126 
(20%) 
632 
(100%) 
Tube well/hand pump 234 
(30%) 
427 
(55%) 
114 
(15%) 
775 
(100%) 
Well 27 
(31%) 
40 
(45%) 
21 
(24%) 
88 
(100%) 
Pond/River 2 
(40%) 
3 
(60%) 
0 
(0%) 
5 
(100%) 
Total 450 789 261 1,500 
 
 
Table 11: RSBY Card Status by Households’ Source of Power 
 Household does not have 
RSBY card 
Household has RSBY 
card but has not used it 
Household has RSBY 
card and has used it 
Total 
Electricity 234 
(30%) 
376 
(49%) 
160 
(21%) 
770 
(100%) 
Kerosene 206 
(30%) 
386 
(56%) 
96 
(14%) 
688 
(100%) 
Other 10 
(24%) 
27 
(64%) 
5 
(12%) 
42 
(100%) 
Total 450 789 261 1,500 
 
 
5.  Econometric Estimation 
 A question that requires an answer is why the proportion of households using their RSBY 
cards – and, by corollary, the proportion of households not using their RSBY cards – varies according 
to household characteristic.  One reason may be that the non-claimants do not need to claim – after 
all, if no one in the household is ill there is no occasion to claim.  The other reason might be difficulty 
in claiming so that having got a card there is, for some households, a further barrier (perhaps 
involving bureaucratic form filling) to using the card.  
 It is hard to believe that the incidence of household illness is different between SC households 
and Hindu households (Table 7); or between illiterate and literate households (Table 8); or between 
households living in pucca houses  and households living in kutcha houses (Table 9); or between 
households whose source of water is the tap  and households whose source of water is the tube 
well/hand pump (Table 10); or between households whose source of power is electricity  and 
households whose source of power is kerosene (Table 11). Indeed, it is much more plausible to 
suppose the incidence of household illness would be greater among the second, compared to the first, 
type of household. An inexorable conclusion would be that the reason that households with less 
favorable attributes, notwithstanding having a RSBY card, do not claim to the same degree as better 
off and more privileged households is that they face relatively higher barriers to claiming. 
 A second question is why certain households did not take out a RSBY card in spite of the fact 
that all of them were BPL households and, by definition, were eligible for a card.  Our hypothesis is 
that this has to with area effects rather than with household choice.  Households cannot take out 
RSBY cards if the facilities for doing so do not exist. 
  In line with the first hypotheses namely that “better off” households might have an advantage 
in terms of claiming benefits on RSBY, we estimated an equation in which the dependent variable 
took the value 1 if a household had a card and claimed, 0 if it had a card and did not claim.  Table 12 
shows the results from estimating such an equation: the results are shown in the form of odds ratios 
and in terms of marginal probabilities.  The latter show how the probability of the event (in this case 
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claiming benefits) would change for a unit change in the determining variable, the values of the other 
variables held constant.8  
 
Table 12: Logit Estimates of the Likelihood of Card Holders Claiming on RSBY* 
The dependent variable takes the value 1 if a household has a card and claims, 0 if it has a card and does not claim 
 Odds 
Ratio 
Standard 
Error 
Z 
value 
Prob>
|z| 
Marginal 
Probability 
Standard 
Error 
Z 
value 
Prob>
|z| 
Household monthly per capita 
consumption expenditure 0.01 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 3.00 0.00 
Top income quintile 
0.05 0.05 1.11 0.27 0.05 0.05 1.11 0.27 
4th income quintile 
0.12 0.04 2.70 0.01 0.12 0.04 2.70 0.01 
3rd  income quintile 
0.12 0.04 2.95 0.00 0.12 0.04 2.95 0.00 
2nd income quintile*** 
0.06 0.04 1.51 0.13 0.06 0.04 1.51 0.13 
Age of household head 
0.01 0.01 1.75 0.08 0.01 0.01 1.75 0.08 
Scheduled Caste household 
0.01 0.03 0.19 0.85 0.01 0.03 0.19 0.85 
Hindu household** 
-0.08 0.03 -2.52 0.01 -0.08 0.03 -2.52 0.01 
Pucca house 
0.09 0.03 2.69 0.01 0.09 0.03 2.69 0.01 
State 
0.11 0.03 3.96 0.00 0.11 0.03 3.96 0.00 
Tehsil 
-0.05 0.03 -1.63 0.10 -0.05 0.03 -1.63 0.10 
* 1,050 observations. **Reference category is other religions. ***Reference category is lowest income quintile 
 The results shown in Table 12 go a long way towards supporting our hypothesis that being 
better off leads to a higher claim propensity.  Higher monthly per capita consumption expenditure by 
a household, higher household income, living in a pucca house were all significantly associated with a 
higher probability of claiming RSBY benefits from the set of households holding such cards. Living 
in Maharashtra, compared to living in UP, significantly raised the proportion of card holders who 
claimed benefits, from 18% in UP to 31% in Maharashtra.  A surprising feature of the result was that 
Hindu household card holders were significantly less likely to claim than SC and non-Hindu 
households. It may be that RSBY restricts the hospitals and doctors from which card holders can 
receive treatment and this restriction may not accord with Hindu tastes. 
 Tables 13 and 14 show the results for estimating the “card take up” equation in which the 
dependent variable takes the value 1 if the household has a RSBY card (regardless of whether it used 
it or not) and the value 0 if the household does not have a RSBY card. The equation was estimated 
separately for Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Maharashtra.  The UP results (Table 13) showed that the 
significant effects on the probability of having a card were: (i) the location of the household in terms 
of the village’s geography; household’s in the corner and on the periphery were significantly less 
likely to have a card compared to households living in the center of the village and (ii) the gram 
panchayat with which the household was associated.  
 The results for Maharashtra (Table 14) were very different from those for UP (Table 13). 
Now area effects were much less important compared to the ability of better off and more powerful 
households to obtain RSBY cards. Hindu households were significantly more likely to have a RSBY 
card than SC or “other religion” households. Households whose source of power was electricity were 
significantly more likely to have a card than households whose source of power was kerosene. 
Households in the upper strata of the income distribution were significantly more likely to have a card 
than households in the lowest income quintile.  All in all, the allocation of RSBY cards was 
significantly skewed towards relatively prosperous households. 
 
                                                     
8 In this case to the sample mean values of the variables 
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Table 13: Logit Estimates of the Likelihood of Being a RSBY Card Holder: Uttar Pradesh* 
The dependent variable takes the value 1 if a household has a card, 0 if it does not have a card  
 Odds 
Ratio 
Standard 
Error 
Z 
value 
Prob> 
|z| 
Marginal 
Probability 
Standard 
Error 
Z 
value 
Prob> 
|z| 
Tehsil 2.32 0.44 4.46 0.00 0.16 0.03 4.67 0.00 
Location outside village 0.50 0.14 -2.51 0.01 -0.13 0.05 -2.55 0.01 
Location at corner of 
village** 0.57 0.11 -2.89 0.00 -0.11 0.04 -2.94 0.00 
Gram Panchayat 1 4.80 1.87 4.02 0.00 0.30 0.07 4.17 0.00 
Gram Panchayat 2 3.05 1.05 3.24 0.00 0.21 0.06 3.32 0.00 
Gram Panchayat 3 2.04 0.73 2.00 0.05 0.14 0.07 2.01 0.04 
Gram Panchayat 4 3.68 1.34 3.57 0.00 0.25 0.07 3.68 0.00 
Gram Panchayat 5 2.22 0.79 2.26 0.02 0.15 0.07 2.28 0.02 
Gram Panchayat 6 3.36 1.26 3.24 0.00 0.23 0.07 3.31 0.00 
Gram Panchayat 7*** 4.19 2.05 2.94 0.00 0.27 0.09 2.99 0.00 
* 742 observations ** Reference category is ‘inside village’. *** The reference category was Gram Panchayat 8. 
 
 
 
Table 14: Logit Estimates of the Likelihood of Being a RSBY Card Holder: Maharashtra* 
The dependent variable takes the value 1 if a household has a card, 0 if it does not have a card 
 Odds 
Ratio 
Standard 
Error 
Z value Prob> |z| Marginal 
Probabilit
y 
Standard 
Error 
Z value Prob> |z| 
Tehsil 0.70 0.12 -2.13 0.03 -0.07 0.03 -2.15 0.03 
Scheduled Caste 
household 
0.98 0.21 -0.09 0.93 0.00 0.04 -0.09 0.93 
Hindu 
household** 
1.60 0.31 2.40 0.02 0.10 0.04 2.44 0.02 
Age of household 
head 
1.05 0.04 1.34 0.18 0.01 0.01 1.35 0.18 
Source of power 
is electricity 
1.47 0.31 1.85 0.07 0.08 0.04 1.86 0.06 
Top income 
quintile 
1.23 0.32 0.80 0.43 0.04 0.05 0.80 0.43 
4th income 
quintile 
1.77 0.49 2.08 0.04 0.12 0.06 2.10 0.04 
3rd  income 
quintile 
1.47 0.34 1.66 0.10 0.08 0.05 1.67 0.09 
2nd income 
quintile*** 
1.59 0.39 1.88 0.06 0.10 0.05 1.89 0.06 
* 750 observations. **Reference category is other religions. ***Reference category is lowest income quintile 
 
   
6. Treatment Effects 
 An important issue in policy analysis is to assess (measure) the outcome or effect of a policy 
intervention or treatment which some members of the public receive but others do not. The heart of 
the analysis lies in constructing in two sets of counterfactuals: (i) What would be the outcome for an 
individual who received the treatment have been if he/she did not get the treatment? (ii) What would 
be the outcome for an individual who did not receive the treatment have been if he/she did get the 
treatment?  The key to quantifying treatment effects lies in answering these two questions. 
 More formally the treatment is represented by θ, so that θ=1 represents receiving the 
treatment and θ=0 represents not receiving the treatment.  Consider an individual i (i=1…N) and Yθ 
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represent his outcome.  Then if individual i did receive treatment 1iY  represents his observed outcome 
and ioY  represents his counterfactual outcome; conversely, if individual i did not receive treatment ioY  
represents his observed outcome and 1iY  represents his counterfactual outcome.  So, for each 
individual i (i=1…N) we have two outcomes - 1 0 and i iY Y - where one is an observed outcome and the 
other is a counterfactual outcome. Consequently, the average treatment effect (ATE) is defined as 
(dropping the subscript i): 
 1 0( )ATE E Y Y= −   (1) 
which is the expected effect of the treatment on a randomly drawn person from the population of 
persons receiving and not receiving the treatment.9 
 A second quantity of interest which receives attention is the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATET) defined as: 
 1 0( | 1)ATET E Y Y θ= − =   (2)   
             The concepts of ATE and ATET can be expanded by conditioning on covariates. If x is a 
vector of covariates, then 1 0 1 0( | ) and ( | , 1)ATE E Y Y ATET E Y Y θ= − = − =x x .  So, the question is: 
how to estimate ATE and ATET when we have a sample on the Y and θ (in other words, we can 
observe the outcome for each person and we know whether or not he/she received treatment) and 
observations on some covariates?  The difficulty is that for any individual we observe 1 0 or Y Y  but not 
both. The observed outcome, Y is: 
 0 1 0 1 0(1 ) ( )Y Y Y Y Y Yθ θ θ= − + = + −   (3) 
A strong assumption is that θ is independent of Y1 and Y0 as would happen with random assignment. 
However, when assignment is not random, so that there is self-selection into treatment, a weaker 
assumption is required. The conditional independence (CI) assumption says that after conditioning 
on covariates, the potential outcomes are conditionally independent of the treatment.10 The overlap 
assumption says that each individual has a positive probability of being included in the treatment.11 
The independent and identically distributed (iid) assumption says the treatment affects only the 
concerned household and does not affect other households. 
 With this background, the estimators proposed in treatment effects literature fall into the 
following categories: 
1. Estimators based on a model for the outcome variable (Regression Analysis, RA). 
2. Estimators based on a model for treatment assignment. (Inverse probability weighted (IPW)). 
3. Estimators based on models for both outcome and treatment variables (Augmented Inverse 
Probability Weighted (AIPW). 
4. Estimators that match on covariates (Nearest Neighbour Matching (NNM)). 
5. Estimators that match on predicted probabilities of treatment (Propensity Score Matching 
PSM). 
 In this paper, we present results for the IPW and PSM estimators on a number of outcome 
variables. We consider two forms of treatment: (i) having a card versus not having a card and (ii) 
having a card and using it versus having a card and not using it. For reasons of economy, we show the 
results for only those outcomes for which the ATE was significantly different from zero. 
  
                                                     
9 ATT has been criticised because it encompasses the entire population including units who would never be 
eligible for treatment. See Woolridge (2010). 
10 Intuitively, the CI assumption says only the covariates affect both the treatment and the potential outcomes. 
11 So, in our case, if there were APL households in the sample who, by definition, were not eligible for a RSBY 
card, the overlap assumption would be violated. 
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Table 15: Treatment Effects on Outcome Variables Arising from Having a RSBY Card and 
Using it Against Having a RSBY Card and not Using it  
Outcome Estimator 
 ATE: IPW ATE:PSM 
Able to generate income from trade and Service 0.09 
(3.09) 
0.10 
(2.53) 
Wishes to start a new life or to expand an existing economic activity 0.11 
(3.11) 
0.10 
(2.37) 
Member of a user group in the village 0.11 
(3.27) 
0.09 
(2.36) 
Got support from village/neighbourhood -0.06 
(1.60) 
-0.06 
(1.52) 
Importance of village for local government -0.1 
(1.86) 
-0.09 
(1.50) 
Central government has reasonable understanding of your situation 0.1 
(4.23) 
0.11 
(3.44) 
 
 
Table 16: Treatment Effects on Outcome Variables Arising from Having a RSBY Card Against 
Not Having a RSBY Card: Uttar Pradesh  
Outcome Estimator 
 ATE: IPW ATE:PSM 
Central government has reasonable understanding of your situation 0.06 
(1.78) 
0.08 
(1.96) 
Has the government attempted to address your needs in the past 5 years 0.07 
(1.70) 
0.07 
(1.81) 
 
 
Table 17: Treatment Effects on Outcome Variables Arising from Having a RSBY Card Against 
Not Having a RSBY Card: Maharashtra  
Outcome Estimator 
 ATE: IPW ATE:PSM 
Able to generate income from trade and Service 0.04 
(1.63) 
0.05 
(2.07) 
Member of a user group in the village 0.17 
(4.83) 
0.17 
(3.94) 
Did you raise your voice in public events 0.08 
(2.21) 
0.07 
(1.67) 
Central government has reasonable understanding of your situation 0.06 
(1.78) 
0.11 
(3.44) 
Has the government attempted to address your needs in the past 5 years 0.07 
(1.70) 
 
 
 Table 15 shows the treatment effects for using a card using the IPW and PSM estimators. 
Using a card (as opposed to having a card and not using it) had a significant effect on (i) the ability to 
generate income from trade and service and (ii) raising the desire to start a new life or expand existing 
activity. In addition, it had several social effects: it encouraged households to join user groups in the 
village and, from a political perspective, it generated the feeling that the central government 
understood people’s needs. 
 Table 16 (UP) and Table 17 (Maharashtra) show the treatment effects for having a card using 
the IPW and PSM estimators. Having a card (as opposed to not having a card) had a significant effect 
in UP in generating a greater sense that the central government understood people’s needs and that it 
had attempted to address these needs. The gains in UP among the RSBY card holders were purely 
political. However, in Maharashtra the gains from having a card extended to ability raise income from 
trade and service, becoming a member of a user group in the village, and having the confidence to 
speak up in public.  
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7. Conclusions 
 A popular theme in the literature on policy making is the idea of ‘capture’. When industry is 
regulated, it attempts to “capture” the regulator to make him act in its interest.  Lobbyists attempt to 
capture legislators and pay them to ask questions on their behalf.  In a similar vein, desirable policy 
initiatives are sought to be captured by influential groups. The RSBY card is no exception. 
 The RSBY poses two barriers: the barriers associated with getting a card even though one 
might be formally entitled to one and the barriers associated with using a card even though one might 
be in possession of one.  As we have seen, getting a card in UP is essentially barrier free except on 
grounds of bureaucratic penetration. However, in Maharashtra, those higher up the income ladder, and 
those in higher social groups were significantly more likely to have a card than those on the lowest 
rung economically and socially. The same is true of usage. Having got a card, it was the better off 
sections of card holders who were more likely to use them. 
A possibility that this paper does not consider is that of “adverse selection”.  This would 
suggest that it is precisely the “bad health risk” households - those households which had, or 
anticipated having, a pre-existing illness in their midst and, therefore, by extension had, or anticipated, 
a bad non-health related outcome12 - that would take out RSBY cards while “healthy” households 
would not bother. On this “lemons” versus “plums” interpretation13 we would expect to see card 
holders to have worse non-health related outcomes than non-card holders simply because RSBY cards 
would be relatively more attractive to bad risk, compared to low risk, households. So RSBY cards 
would be associated with bad outcomes, not because holding a RSBY card caused a bad outcome but 
because households at risk of bad outcomes, through actual or anticipated ill-health, were attracted to 
RSBY cards. 
  
                                                     
12 Like loss of income or output. 
13 See Akerlof (1970). 
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Appendix on BPL Calculations 
1. BPL survey for 9
th 
Plan (1997-2002) (Rural). Annual family income to be less than Rs. 20,000 and 
the families should not have more than 2 hectares of land or TV or Fridge. The number of rural BPL 
families was 6.5 lakh during the 9
th 
Plan. The survey based on these criteria was again carried out in 
2002 and the total number of 3.87 lakh families was identified. This figure was in force till September, 
2006. 
2.  BPL for 10
th 
Plan (2002-07) (Rural) This survey is based on the degree of deprivation in respect of 
13 parameters (with scores from 0-4) – land holding, type of house, clothing, food security, sanitation, 
consumer durables, literacy status, labour force, means of livelihood, status of children, type of 
indebtedness, reasons for migrations etc. The Planning Commission fixed an upper limit of 3.26 lakh 
for rural BPL families on the basis of simple survey. Accordingly families having less than 15 marks 
out of maximum 52 marks have been classified as BPL and their number works out to 3.18 lakh. The 
survey was carried out in 2002 and thereafter but could not be finalised due to stay by the SC. The stay 
was vacated in February, 2006 and this survey was finalised and adopted in September, 2006. This 
survey would form the basis for benefits under GoI schemes. The state government is free to adopt any 
criteria/survey for the state level schemes. 
3.  10
th 
Plan BPL Survey for Urban Families. This survey was based on degree of deprivation in respect 
of 7 parameters – roof, floor, water, sanitation, education level, type of employment & status of 
children in a house. A total of 1.25 lakh upper families were identified as BPL in urban area in 2004. It 
is under implementation since then. 
4.  Kerala Government. Most of the state governments followed the 13 and 7 parameters definition for 
identifying the BPL families during the current 10
th 
Plan. Kerala’s is one of the few state governments 
which have formulated its own criteria. There are nine parameters and if the family does not have 
access to 4 or more parameters than it is classified as BPL. The 9 parameters for urban areas are – No 
land/Less than 5 cents of land, No house/dilapidated house, No sanitation latrine, Family without 
colour TV, No regular employed person in the family, No access to safe drinking water, Women 
headed house hold/Presence of widow divorcee, Socially disadvantaged groups SC/ST & Mentally 
retarded/disabled member in the family. The nine parameters for rural are - No land/Less than 5 cents 
of land, No house/dilapidated house, No sanitation latrine, Family with an illiterate adult member, No 
regular employed person in the family, No access to safe drinking water, Women headed house 
hold/Presence of widow divorcee, Socially disadvantaged groups SC/ST & Mentally retarded/disabled 
member in the family. 
5.  Haryana Government. The BPL survey was carried out as per the GoI guidelines in Haryana and it 
was based on 13 parameters. The Government has recently dis-carded it and adopted new 5 para-
meters based survey. The 5 points are – land, house, household goods, literacy level and means of 
livelihood /standard of living. The survey is to be carried out by Ex-serviceman who would be paid Rs. 
4 per family. 
6.  Maharashtra Government. The Maharashtra Government has also decided to conduct fresh BPL 
survey. About 46 lakh BPL families were identified on the basis of 13 point criteria. There was lot of 
resentment and a total of 10.56 lakh appeals were filed against the survey. In view of this they have 
decided to discard the survey and conduct fresh survey.  
 
 
 
 
